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ENGAGED CLIENT-CENTERED
REPRESENTATION AND THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAWYER-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
Katherine R. Kruse*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Thank you for inviting me here to speak with you today about
engaged client-centered representation. I am going to talk about the
continuities and discontinuities between the way lawyers and clients are
viewed in the two worlds in which I live: the world of legal ethics
scholarship and the world of clinical legal education. It is fitting that I
get the opportunity to have this conversation at Hofstra, because Hofstra
is a place with a rich tradition and history in both areas.
I begin with a story that goes back to the beginning of legal ethics
as we know it today: before the ABA promulgated the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct; before Professional Responsibility courses were
required in law schools; before states required mandatory CLE credits in
ethics; and before legal scholars wrote systematically about the
relationship between lawyers’ duties and lawyers’ roles in society and in
our system of justice. Before that whole substructure of legal ethics
analysis had been constructed, lawyers worked out the details of their
professional responsibilities to clients and to the public in conversation
with other lawyers engaged in the same kind of practice, trying to figure
out together what it meant to be good lawyers.
The story is about the consequences of a conversation among
lawyers about their professional responsibilities. 1 In the early 1960s, a
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
B.A., Oberlin College; M.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law
School. This speech was given as the Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics
Lecture, Hofstra Law School, October 6, 2010.
1. The details of this story are drawn from Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About
Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133, 136-39 (2008).
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group of criminal defense lawyers got together regularly to talk through
tactical questions about how to do their jobs faithfully and well. In one
of their meetings, the subject of client perjury came up. One of the
members of the group confessed a problem to which she had no good
solution: her client was going to testify at trial, she thought the client
was going to lie, and she did not know what she was supposed to do
about it. The group realized that this was a difficult question that they
had each faced at one time or another, and that they had faced it largely
alone. It was not the kind of question they had wanted to talk about out
loud and in public. As they talked through the issue, they realized that
the Canons of Professional Responsibility were inconsistent with respect
to the duties of confidentiality toward clients and candor toward the
courts, and that there were different ways to resolve the inconsistency.
So, they came up with a variety of different answers or strategies for
dealing with the situation.
These were also the early days of Gideon v. Wainwright, 2 when the
constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases had just been
established. 3 One of the young lawyers who had been part of this
discussion group had started an institute to train lawyers in criminal
defense work. In a training session at that institute, he presented the
question of what a lawyer should do when faced with potential client
perjury, laid out a variety of possible resolutions, and defended the idea
that if efforts to dissuade the client from testifying falsely failed, it was
consistent with a lawyer’s ethical duties to maintain confidentiality and
present the client’s testimony anyway. The lecture was reported in the
press; the next day, he was served with notice of disbarment proceedings
for even suggesting such a thing out loud and in public. In defending
himself against these ethical charges, that lawyer wrote a law review
article laying out the rationale for his answer and showing that he was
not just fomenting disrespect for the law or disrespect for the courts, but
that he was advancing a thoughtful answer to a difficult question that
was grounded in lawyers’ professional roles and duties.
As many of you probably know, that young man was Monroe
Freedman, and his article, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 4 along with his later
book, Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System, 5 were among the first
thoughtful, comprehensive descriptions of what it means for a lawyer to
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. Id. at 338-39, 344.
4. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).
5. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
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zealously represent a client within the bounds of the law and how central
that concept is to our societal notions of fairness, dignity, autonomy, and
justice. Freedman argued in that work and elsewhere that at the very
heart of this comprehensive vision of zealous advocacy within the
bounds of the law, there is a relationship—the lawyer-client
relationship. 6 And, that relationship is a very human relationship built on
a foundation of loyalty by the lawyer and trust by the client. Freedman
argued then, as he has continued to argue vigorously over the years, that
if we have ethical rules that require lawyers to betray their clients, it will
destroy the loyalty and trust in the lawyer-client relationship, make it
impossible for lawyers to perform their adversary function properly, and
undermine the foundation of our system of justice. 7
The field of legal ethics, as we know it today, has grown out of
thoughtful, systematic grounding of lawyers’ duties in a comprehensive
understanding of lawyers’ roles and the situating of lawyers’ roles in
underlying theories of law, morality, and justice. Unfortunately, in the
process, the field of theoretical legal ethics has mostly lost track of the
thing that Freedman insisted was at the heart of a lawyers’ role: the
integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. As I will discuss, the field of
theoretical legal ethics has developed in ways that are deeply lawyercentered rather than fundamentally client-centered. I am going to speak
about how that happened. I am also going to share some of my ideas
about what it would mean to ground a fundamentally client-centered
conception of lawyers’ duties to represent a client zealously within the
bounds of the law in moral, political, and jurisprudential theory.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL LAWYER-CENTERED APPROACH TO LEGAL
ETHICS

By the mid-1970s, theoretical interest in legal ethics was on the
rise. But many of the people who were thinking and writing in the new
field did not begin their careers as legal ethicists the way Monroe
Freedman did: by talking to other lawyers about what it means to be a
good lawyer and grounding the insight of that experience in theory.
Instead, they approached legal ethics as philosophers exploring what
David Luban called the “hard, unsolved . . . issues in legal ethics that are
amenable to treatment by moral philosophy.” 8 From the perspective of
6. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 68-70,
128-29 (4th ed. 2010); Freedman, supra note 4, at 1470.
7. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 6, at 128, 137-39; Freedman, supra note 4, at 1470,
1473, 1475.
8. David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal
Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 452 (1981).
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philosophers, the interesting questions in legal ethics arose from
conflicts between the demands of lawyers’ professional roles and
ordinary morality. 9 The theoretically interesting questions centered on,
in the words of Charles Fried: “Can a good lawyer be a good person?” 10
To frame the important and interesting questions of legal ethics in
terms of conflicts between role morality and ordinary morality, moral
philosophers had to define lawyers’ role morality in a way that would
create conflicts between moral responsibility and professional duty.
According to the moral philosophers, lawyers occupy a simplified and
morally problematic universe in which their decisionmaking was
determined according to only two parameters: client objectives and the
bounds of the law. 11 I am going to argue later that an engaged clientcentered approach to pursuing a client’s objectives within the bounds of
the law is not at all simplified and much less morally problematic than
the moral philosophers in legal ethics have painted it to be. But first, I
need to better explain the philosophers’ critique of traditional legal
ethics.
To create philosophically interesting conflicts between role
morality and ordinary morality, the moral philosophers in legal ethics
had to define the parameters of professional duty—client objectives and
the bounds of the law—in a particular and simplistic way. The bounds of
the law were understood within the moral philosophical critique as
allowing lawyers to do whatever they wanted to do, as long as they
could find a way to justify it with legal arguments. With respect to the
bounds of the law, moral philosophers pointed out that lawyers did not
typically engage in good faith interpretation of the meaning of legal
limits. 12 Instead, lawyers engaged in a kind of linguistic gamesmanship
that stretched the meaning of law well past its intended purposes. 13 And
this expansive conception of the bounds of the law, which included any
colorable interpretation of law that lawyers could argue with a straight
face, was insufficient to contain over-zealous partisan tactics. 14
As it turns out, the territory out at the colorable limits of the law is
fertile ground for the kinds of conflicts between role morality and
ordinary morality that the moral philosophers wanted to explore
9. Id. at 454-56.
10. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976).
11. Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63,
73-74 (1980).
12. Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
103, 111 (2010).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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theoretically. When you push the limits of the law out past its intended
purposes, a lot of things are legally permissible, and not all of them are
morally right. But the moral philosophers could not get lawyers out to
the colorable limits of the law on their own steam. Lawyers’ professional
duties are to pursue their clients’ objectives, and if their clients want
things that most law-abiding people want, then lawyers do not have
occasion to push out to the colorable limits of the law. To create
dilemmas between role morality and ordinary morality, the moral
philosophers also had to posit clients who wanted to use the law to
maximize their own wealth, freedom, and power over others.
The examples that moral philosophers gave of lawyers’ moral
dilemmas took on a predictable structure: they involved clients who
wanted to do the wrong thing and harm innocent third parties but whose
actions nonetheless fell within the arguable bounds of the law. For
example, a man owes a debt, but his creditor has waited too long to
collect it, so the man has an arguable statute of limitations defense to
defeat his moral obligation to repay his creditor. 15 Or, a man wants to
disinherit his son because he disagrees with his son’s opposition to the
Vietnam War. 16 Some of these examples came from actual cases. One
particularly well-worn example arose from the facts in the 1962 case
Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 17 in which the defendant in a personal injury
case discovered through a medical examination of the plaintiff that the
plaintiff was suffering from a life-threatening aortic aneurysm, but the
law did not compel the defense to turn over the results of that medical
examination, and the defendant settled the case without ever advising the
plaintiff that his life was in danger. 18
You may already be familiar with these examples or examples like
them, because they are the kinds of examples you have probably
encountered in your professional responsibility classes. Now, if you
were a particularly bold student in your professional responsibility class,
you might have asked, when confronted with an example like the one in
Spaulding: Why doesn’t the lawyer just ask the client if the client is
willing to reveal the damaging medical information to help save the
plaintiff’s life? 19 But a question like that threatens to do away with the
conflict between role morality and ordinary morality that the example is
15. See, e.g., Postema, supra note 11, at 66.
16. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers As Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 7
(1975).
17. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
18. Id. at 707-08, 710.
19. This point has consistently been made over time by Monroe Freedman. See Monroe H.
Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 200-01
(1978).
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meant to illustrate. It diverts the discussion away from the lawyer’s
moral dilemma and onto the question of what kind of discussion is
appropriate for the lawyer and the client to have about whether to reveal
the information. To get the discussion back to the main point—the
lawyer’s moral dilemma—you were probably told to assume that the
client will not agree to reveal the information.
To focus on the lawyers’ moral dilemma, clients had to be
constructed as what I have elsewhere called “‘cardboard clients,’” who
care only about the advancement of their own interests and are
unconcerned with the harm caused to others. 20 As you can see, the
lawyers in these examples are assumed to be basically good people.
They want to lead moral lives and to do the right thing. They do not
want to harm other people. They are not in it for the money. People like
that can be trusted to make good moral decisions, and if they were not
required to abide by their clients’ wishes, they would probably make
good moral decisions about their clients’ lives and affairs. The problem
is not with the lawyers themselves, but with the professional duty to
pursue the client’s objectives up to the limits of the law. Because the law
does not require clients to do the right thing, because clients have no
incentive to do the right thing on their own, and because lawyers are
duty-bound to press their clients’ objectives all the way to the arguable
limits of the law, there must be something rotten at the very core of legal
ethics. To fulfill your professional duty to be a good lawyer, you have to
be a morally bad person.
The solution that the moral philosophers arrived at was that we
should hold lawyers morally responsible for the actions they take as
lawyers. 21 They argued that re-introducing ordinary moral responsibility
and judgment into professional decisionmaking would remove the
professional obligation to do the wrong thing in the name of professional
role and encourage lawyers to set limits on their legal representation that
seem right to them, based on their own moral compasses. 22 If legal
representation were shaped by the moral judgment of lawyers rather than
the partisan duty to clients, it would prevent harm from coming to
innocent third parties. And it would permit lawyers to integrate their
duties as good lawyers into their ordinary moral lives as good persons. 23

20. Kruse, supra note 12, at 103, 121.
21. David Luban has presented the best-developed version of this view. See DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 160 (1988).
22. See id.
23. The drive toward this kind of integration is explored at length more recently in DANIEL
MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 155-170
(2008).
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The solution that the moral philosophers offered made sense—that is, if
you accept the assumptions about moral lawyers and cardboard clients
on which it was based.
If you take away the assumptions about moral lawyers and
cardboard clients, there are some fairly obvious problems with this
solution. 24 If you assume that lawyers and clients are equally capable of
sound moral decisionmaking, it does not make a lot of sense to give
lawyers a moral veto over their clients’ decisions. After all, the decisions
made in legal representation are going to affect the client’s life. There is
no reason to believe that lawyers’ legal training gives them particular
moral expertise. Our democratic system is based on the idea that we are
a government of laws, not men—and that means clients should be able
to pursue their objectives within the bounds of legitimate legal limits,
not within the bounds of their lawyers’ moral compasses. And when you
further consider that we live in a morally pluralistic society,
characterized by fundamental moral disagreement over foundational
values, the idea that the client’s affairs ought to be governed by the
lawyer’s moral compass becomes even less defensible.
I have previously explored the challenge of moral pluralism by
positing a lawyer-client relationship between a lesbian couple who is
preparing to have a child by insemination or adoption in a state that does
not explicitly permit gay marriage or co-adoption, and a lawyer who
believes that homosexuality is immoral and that it is damaging for
children to be raised in a same-sex household.25 I created this example to
critique the moral philosophers’ solution because if you take the
lawyer’s point of view, the example has all the earmarks of the typical
legal ethics hypothetical: a client who wants to do something immoral
that threatens harm to an innocent third party and a legal context in
which the lawyer has to push out to the arguable limits of the law to
accomplish the client’s goals. But it is also quite clearly an example in
which it is inappropriate for the client’s life decisions to be guided by
the lawyer’s moral compass. I am going to return to this example later,
but before I do that, I want to turn to a question that I hope you are
asking yourself by now: isn’t there a better solution than what the moral
philosophers offer us?

24. See TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES?: A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION
89-99 (2009).
25. Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 389, 393, 408 (2005).
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A DIFFERENT DIAGNOSIS AND A DIFFERENT SOLUTION

There is a better solution. In fact, there is a completely different
way of diagnosing the problems of legal professionalism that lie at the
core of the moral philosophers’ concerns. But to get there, you have to
bring to mind a different image of clients. You have to imagine a client
who walks into a lawyer’s office with a human problem or situation: she
has been injured on the job, she wants to file for divorce, she has just
fired an employee and has been sued for wrongful termination, or she
wants to start a business and does not know what regulations or
procedures apply to her. What the lawyer does—what the lawyer has
been trained to do and has expertise in doing—is to sort the facts of that
human problem or situation into a series of legal categories: claims,
defenses, procedures, and evidentiary proof. The lawyer “issue-spots”
the client in much the same way that law students learn to issue-spot
facts in a law school exam. In the process of issue-spotting, the lawyer
distills the legally relevant facts and determines what strategies and
structures are legally available for pursuing the client’s objectives. 26
As a result of their legal professional training, lawyers have a
tendency to over-value their clients' legal rights and interests relative to
the weight that their clients might assign to the protection of those rights
and interests when the clients compares them to the other things that the
clients value. If a lawyer is not careful, a client’s human problem can
disappear, and the client can appear instead as a bundle of legal rights
and interests walking around in a human body. The client’s important
non-legal interests—the client’s relationships with others, reputation and
standing in the community, values, and commitments that the client
wants to honor—can fade into the background as the client’s legal rights
and interests come more sharply into focus.
When we add to this picture the fact that protecting one’s own legal
rights and interests almost always involves maximizing one’s own
wealth, freedom, and power at the expense of others, we start to see
something really interesting. We have criticized the moral philosophers
for assuming that clients are just cardboard figures who want to take
advantage of other people and are impervious to moral restraint. But
now we see that in the practice of law and in the very process of
employing legal expertise, lawyers are in danger of doing something

26. For further discussion of this diagnosis of the problem in legal professionalism, see
Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client’s Interests, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078, 1079-82 (1979);
Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyers’ Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 181,
183-85, 188-91 (1999); and William H. Simon, Commentary, The Ideology of Advocacy:
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 53-55.
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very similar. They are in danger of over-valuing their clients’ legal rights
and interests and disregarding the other values, relationships, and
commitments that clients bring to the table (what I have called the
problem of legal objectification). 27 And, from the outside, that can look
a lot like zealously pursuing the interests of selfish, grasping clients to
the limits of the law.
Though they may look the same in terms of lawyer behavior, the
problem of lawyers who legally issue-spot their clients is actually quite
different from the problem of role morality as it was posed by the moral
philosophers in both its diagnosis and in its solution. In the legal issuespotting diagnosis, we are not imagining that clients really are only
interested in maximizing their wealth, freedom, and power—we are
imagining that the lawyer’s preoccupation with the client’s legal rights
and interests has caused the client’s other values to fade into the
background. The solution is not to turn over moral control of the
representation to the lawyer—it is to get lawyers to bring the client’s
other interests and concerns back into the picture so that the legal
representation can be directed toward objectives that put the pursuit of
legal interests into the context of the client's other values, relationships,
and concerns.
What I have just described is the client-centered approach to
lawyering that forms the centerpiece for most teaching about the
professional skills of interviewing and counseling and is the established
orthodoxy of most teaching that goes on within clinical legal
education. 28 The client-centered approach was developed in the mid1970s, during the same period of time that the moral philosophers in
legal ethics were exploring conflicts between role morality and ordinary
morality. The client-centered approach can be seen as addressing the
same basic problematic behavior that the moral philosophers observed—
that lawyers are intent on pursuing their clients’ objectives, narrowly
defined as the maximization of wealth, freedom, and power over others,
all the way up to the arguable limits of the law.
But the client-centered approach diagnoses the source of the
problem differently and it offers a different solution. The moral
philosophers diagnosed the problem as lawyers who were trapped within
a professional role that bound them to the zealous pursuit of their clients’
interests and prevented them from exercising moral judgment. The
27. See Kruse, supra note 12, at 122-24.
28. For a more comprehensive discussion of client-centered representation, see generally
Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV.
501 (1990); and Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006).
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client-centered approach diagnosed the problem as lawyers who
distorted their clients’ objectives by over-valuing the clients’ legal
interests and losing track of the clients’ non-legal interests. The solution
that the client-centered approach offered was a broader range of lawyer
deference to client decisionmaking on the theory that lawyers may be
experts on the law, but only clients are experts on their own lives.
I am a proponent of client-centered lawyering, both because I think
it provides a better diagnosis of the problems in legal professionalism
and because I think it offers a more attractive solution than the moral
philosophers have offered us. It is more attractive because it allows us to
re-introduce moral responsibility into legal representation by defining
the duty of partisanship to include a responsibility to shape legal
representation around a more robust and holistic understanding of client
objectives. It provides a source of limitation on lawyers’ no-holds-barred
partisanship that springs directly from lawyers’ professional duties to
pursue their clients’ objectives, rather than from appeals to lawyers’
moral compasses that compete with professional duty and undermine the
values of autonomy, dignity, equality, and the rule of law. But the
question of what it means to be a good client-centered lawyer is a
complicated one, and its applicability outside the context of individual
client relationships is questionable. I will spend the rest of my time here
exploring these complications and limitations in more detail.
A. Engaged Client-Centered Representation
When the client-centered approach to legal representation was first
introduced in the lawyering skills literature, its methods were based on
deference to client decisionmaking, techniques of neutral interviewing
and counseling, and a philosophy of minimizing interference with client
decisionmaking. 29 The assumption implicit in these methods was that
clients already knew what their objectives were, and that lawyers needed
to take special care not to distort their clients’ objectives by expressing
opinions about what the clients ought to do or even offer legal advice. 30
As the client-centered approach has become more sophisticated
over time, most lawyering theorists have acknowledged that this kind of
detachment and non-interference by the lawyer is not only unworkable,
29. See Dinerstein, supra note 28, at 507-09.
30. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:
A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 51-57 (1977). Later versions of this interviewing and counseling
textbook have significantly modified this stark view. See DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 289 (2d ed. 2004) (“Client-centeredness does not
require you to hide from giving advice . . . Client-centeredness encompasses the notion that as a
matter of autonomy, clients who seek your help are entitled to ask for and receive advice.”).
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but it is also undesirable. 31 What has emerged instead are varying
degrees of lawyer engagement in helping clients determine their
objectives in light of the law and “in light of the clients’ own
understandings of themselves, their relationships with others and the
world and the clients’ evolving desires about what they want.” 32
Engaged client-centered representation recognizes that clients do not
arrive with static and pre-determined objectives to which lawyers can
simply defer. Clients’ objectives are tied to their feelings, relationships
and experiences; their objectives often change over the course of
representation; and their objectives are shaped in part by the information
about the law and available legal options that their lawyers explain to
them. 33
The basic guiding principle underlying client-centered
representation is to value and enhance the client’s autonomy, both within
the lawyer-client relationship and within society. Moral philosophers
have criticized client autonomy as a basis for legal ethics, arguing that
autonomy has no moral value in itself; that what has moral value is what
people do with their autonomy. 34 However, this criticism equates
“‘autonomy’” with “doing whatever [you] want” in the moment. 35
Ironically, it is from the field of moral philosophy that we get a much
deeper and richer version of what autonomy means, which can help
guide lawyers past the neutral and non-interventionist roots of clientcentered lawyering and into the nuances of an engaged client-centered
approach to determining their client’s objectives.
The word “‘autonomy’” means, quite literally, “‘self-rule,’” 36 and
philosophers have understood it to encompass both the “negative”
freedom to be free from the interference of others, and the “positive”
freedom to grow, discover, evolve and flourish in one’s own way. 37

31. One of the earliest and most comprehensive critics of this view was Stephen Ellmann. See
generally Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1992); Stephen
Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987). For an overview of the different kinds
of critiques of lawyer neutrality that have emerged within the client-centered lawyering theory
literature, see Kruse, supra note 28, at 385-399.
32. STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING
AND COUNSELING 7 (2009).
33. See id. at 6-7, 23.
34. See David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 638-39.
35. David Luban, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy
Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 826 (arguing against both this popular conception and a
more sophisticated Kantian notion of self-rule).
36. Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 281, 286 n.19 (2003).
37. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 123-34
(1969).
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Joseph Raz described the ability to define and become the person one
wants to be over the course of one’s lifetime in terms of “authorship” of
one’s own life. 38 Under this more expansive view, one’s autonomy—the
ability to be the author of one’s own life—can be constrained in a
number of different ways. One’s autonomy can be frustrated by external
forces or conditions that create a lack of meaningful choice in the
world. 39 One’s ability to be the person one wants to be can also be
defeated by succumbing to fleeting desires. 40 The story of Odysseus,
who commanded his crew to tie him to the mast of his ship so that he
will not be tempted by the call of the Sirens is a classic example used by
philosophers to explain how interfering with what someone wants to do
in the moment may actually enhance their autonomy by preserving their
fidelity to their own deeper-seated values. 41
However, we are not often like Odysseus in knowing and being
able to articulate what our deepest-seated values are and requesting help
in staying true to them. Living a life in accordance with our values is
likely to be a process that unfolds over time. Our deepest values are
often opaque and come clear to us only through the process of making
choices over time. Our values are diverse and likely to be internally
inconsistent, forcing us to prioritize and choose between them as we
move through life. It is through practical choices made in situations of
value conflict or confusion that we are likely to discover, articulate, and
actualize the kind of persons we want to be.
Legal representation is often a site for those kinds of practical
choices that bring deeper-seated values to light. Because the situations
that lead clients to seek legal representation often involve disruptions or
threats to the status quo, plans for the future, or responses to new
opportunities, clients’ legal issues are often entangled with deeper
values, projects, commitments, and relationships with others. Engaged
client-centered representation recognizes that in pursuing a client’s
objectives in legal representation, lawyers are doing much more than
simply taking “hired gun” marching orders from their clients. To
determine what the client’s objectives are, lawyers often engage their
clients in a process of value clarification that includes techniques of
active listening and probing beneath the surface of a client’s stated
wishes to ensure that what the client says he wants is consistent with the
client’s other values and to ensure that the decisions made by the client

38.
39.
40.
41.

JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 155, 369 (1986).
Id. at 372-74.
See GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 14-15 (1988).
See id.
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in the moment will stand the test of time as the client’s situation
changes.
The touchstone for engaged client-centered representation is to
shape legal representation around the client's own values. This attention
to client values strikes a middle ground between the “hired gun”
approach of neutral non-interference and thicker notions of the lawyerclient relationship proposed by some legal ethicists. Some legal ethicists
have argued that the ideal lawyer-client relationship should be like a
friendship, in which lawyers and clients mutually strive for goodness as
they collaborate in addressing the moral issues that inevitably arise in
legal representation. Legal representation, they argue, should be a moral
give-and-take between lawyers and clients in which both lawyers and
clients try to make each other better persons. 42 This view of the lawyerclient relationship as this kind of friendship aims beyond helping a client
articulate the client’s objectives according to the client’s own values and
seeks to morally educate the client.
In my view, these thicker notions of the lawyer-client relationship
as a friendship or mutual search for the good are both unrealistic and
inappropriate goals for legal representation. Clients retain lawyers
because lawyers have legal expertise. Lawyers are also people with the
same moral expertise as anyone else. Clients may seek moral counsel
from their lawyers, just as they might from their teachers, dentists, or
plumbers. But in choosing a lawyer, clients typically do not have the
personal information that we rely on when we turn to friends for moral
guidance, such as whether they share our values or have the life
experience to understand our dilemmas or empathize with our
struggles. 43 Moral insight may come from a client’s process of clarifying
his values in legal representation and moral advice may be incidental to
that process. However, moral instruction—like moral control—is an
inappropriate goal for lawyers to have in the lawyer-client relationship.
With these principles in mind, let’s go back to Spaulding, the
personal injury case in which the defendant’s doctor discovered that the
plaintiff was likely suffering from an aortic aneurysm, which may have
been caused by the automobile accident. The defendant did not reveal
this fact to the plaintiff, a choice that eventually led the court to set aside
the judgment based on the parties’ settlement. 44 In 1998, Roger Cramton
and Lori Knowles investigated the decades-old facts of this professional
responsibility classic by combing through court records and interviewing
42. For the most prominent articulation of this view, see THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F.
COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 46-50 (2d ed. 2009).
43. See DARE, supra note 24, at 92.
44. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 710-11 (Minn. 1962).

590

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:577

lawyers, judges, and surviving family members. 45 Based on their
investigation, it appears likely that the defendant’s lawyer, who was paid
by an insurance company, pushed the case through to settlement without
ever consulting his client about whether to reveal the information about
the life-threatening medical condition to the plaintiff. 46 Doing so served
the legal and financial interests of both the client and the insurance
company, who may have been liable for greater damages if the more
serious condition had come to light.
But was it consistent with the long-term values, relationships, and
commitments of the defendant, John Zimmerman? The Zimmermans
and the Spauldings were neighbors in rural Minnesota, and twenty-yearold David Spaulding (the plaintiff) worked together with nineteen-yearold John Zimmerman (the defendant) in the Zimmerman’s road
construction business. 47 The automobile accident occurred at dusk when
the car driven by John Zimmerman, who was transporting employees of
his father’s road construction business home at the end of the day,
collided with a car occupied by the Ledermann family on their way
home from the county fair. 48 It was a tragic event for all three families
involved. In addition to seriously injuring David Spaulding, the accident
killed twelve-year-old Elaine Ledermann and John Zimmerman’s
brother James, and broke the neck of John Zimmerman’s father,
Edward. 49
Given the close relationships in a tight-knit community and the
devastating losses that his own family had already suffered, it is quite
likely that John Zimmerman would have consented to reveal medical
information critically important to David Spaulding’s life and health.
That is, if his lawyer had cared about representing his legal interests
within the context of his other values. This is an important point, in no
small part because the stripped-down facts of Spaulding have been used
for so many years in legal ethics to create a moral dilemma for David
Zimmerman’s lawyer: What do you do when your client insists on
keeping potentially life-saving information confidential? 50 The case is
only rarely used to point to the need for lawyers to consult their clients
rather than assuming that their clients will want to maximize their legal
45. Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions:
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REV. 63, 63 n.2 (1998).
46. See id. at 69-70.
47. Id. at 63-64.
48. Id. at 64.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 21, at 179 (describing Spaulding as an example of a situation
in which “lawyers may be required by the duty of confidentiality silently to permit the ruination of
innocent third parties”).
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and financial interests at the expense of others. 51 And those kinds of
assumptions, which limit legal representation to a client’s narrowlydefined legal interests, are the kind of problems that engaged clientcentered representation is designed to address.
B. The Limits and Possibilities of an Engaged Client-Centered Theory
of Legal Ethics
Are there limits to engaged client-centered representation? I think
there are, and I want to mention two of them. One limit is raised by the
lesbian family planning example I alluded to earlier, where the lesbian
couple goes to a lawyer to get advice on how to use existing law to
structure their family affairs so that their child can enjoy a family
relationship that best approximates the kind of relationship the child
would have if they were legally able to marry. 52 Because we are
imagining that the law does not permit same-sex marriage or coadoption in their state, the law only imperfectly captures what the couple
wants to do. It may come as a surprise to the clients that they cannot
simply replicate a legal family out of existing legal structures. In making
legal decisions in light of that information, the couple may be forced to
confront their deeper values about trust, loyalty, and family as they
consider how they feel about having legally asymmetrical relationships
with a child who cannot be co-adopted and what to do about the possible
parental rights of the child’s biological father. If the lawyer in that
scenario believes strongly that what the clients are doing is morally
wrong and damaging to the child, it may be difficult for the lawyer to
take the clients through a sensitive and probing discussion of how to
pursue their available legal options in ways that honor their deeper
values, individually and as a couple.
In such circumstances, it can be difficult for the lawyer to achieve
the empathy required to put oneself in the client’s shoes and understand
the value trade-offs from the client’s point of view. The very task of
finding ways within the law to structure a non-traditional family may be
experienced by the lawyer as a betrayal of his own ideals, a betrayal of
community values, or a threat to his own identity. To the extent that the
lawyer strays outside the stable confines of pure legal interest-based
advice and counseling and enters a broader conversation about the

51. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1606-07 (1995) (describing the facts
as a missed opportunity for client counseling).
52. The lesbian family planning example is discussed more fully in Kruse, supra note 25, at
408-11.
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clients’ values, he is likely to find himself in a moral conflict of interest
where his personal values and commitments materially limit his nuanced
exploration of his client’s options. The temptation for the lawyer in such
a situation is to avoid the conflict by detaching emotionally and viewing
the situation logically within the confines of maximizing the client’s
legal interests.
A lawyer in Tennessee found himself in this type of situation. 53 He
petitioned to be taken off the appointment list for representing girls
seeking judicial bypasses of parental consent for abortion because of his
own beliefs about assisting what he viewed as the termination of a
human life impaired his ability to fully counsel his clients. 54 Full
counseling, in his view, included advising them to talk to their parents or
to seek alternatives to abortion. 55 The Supreme Court of Tennessee
responded that the lawyer’s moral commitments were not a compelling
reason to be relieved of court-appointed duty, saying that the lawyer
must set aside his moral views and represent his clients’ legal interests
impartially. 56 As we broaden our ideas about competent legal
representation to include engaged client-centered counseling that goes
beyond advice about legal interests, we are calling on lawyers to
exercise a broader range of problem-solving skills than merely legal
reasoning and analysis, and we must recognize the limits that moral
conflicts of interest may set on the deployment of those broader skills.
Second, we must be attuned to the difficulties that inhere in
translating the vision of engaged client-centered lawyering into contexts
where clients’ objectives and values are difficult to ascertain through
methods of self-reflection and value clarification. Two particular
contexts spring to mind. One is the situation of diminished-capacity
clients—children, adolescents, or elderly clients—whose ability to
engage in value clarification may be limited. 57 The other is the situation
of entity clients like corporations, where the “real” client is not a human
being at all, but is instead a legal fiction. The methods of engaged clientcentered representation—active listening and probing the client to more
deeply explore the client’s legal options within a framework of the
client’s own values—are of limited utility in such circumstances.

53. See Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., Formal Op. 96-F-140, at 1
(1996).
54. See id. at 1, 3.
55. See id. at 1-2.
56. See id. at 3-5.
57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2007) (model rule for “Client with
Diminished Capacity”).
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However, I would argue that engaged client-centered representation
is still valuable in defining an ideal toward which a lawyer ought to
strive in these contexts. When the client’s values are less than fully
developed, where the client is unable to articulate them, or where the
client is not a human being at all, the lawyer may be tempted to revert to
one of two extremes. One temptation is to return to legal interest-based
representation that views client objectives only in terms of maximizing
the client’s wealth, freedom, and power over others. This is a safe
default choice to take in the absence of knowing that the client has
competing values. But this takes us right back to kind of legal interestsbased counseling that engaged client-centered representation is designed
to avoid. The other is for a lawyer to impose her own values on
representation in the guise of substituted judgment, by assuming that the
client’s values are consistent with the lawyer’s values. But this returns us
to the role of the lawyer as a moral director of the client's affairs.
In the area of diminished-capacity representation, lawyering
theorists who teach in clinics that represent children, elderly persons
suffering from dementia, or mentally impaired clients, have been carving
out a kind of solution that avoids each of these extremes. 58 Lawyering
theorists in this area suggest that lawyers should strive to make decisions
that represent the client’s unique values to the extent that those values
can be ascertained and separated from the lawyer’s values. Elderly
clients may be impaired in decisionmaking, but they have a lifetime of
choices in other contexts that reflect and reveal their values. Children
may have insufficient life experience to have fully-formed values, but
they have a set of preferences on which a lawyer can draw to infer
deeper values that are unique to them.
In the corporate context, the discussion has been dominated by
legal ethicists who propose variations on the moral lawyering solutions,
urging lawyers to act as “lawyer-statesmen” taking a leadership role in
helping their clients develop a sense of social responsibility or by
defenders of the stark view of lawyers as hired guns. There has been less
attention to how a third path between these extremes might be carved. 59
The legal ethical discussion in the corporate client context would be
enriched by considering what it might mean to approximate an approach
58. For an excellent discussion of the challenges of client-centered lawyering in these
contexts, see generally Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed
Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505 (1996); and
Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably
Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515.
59. See Kruse, supra note 12, at 118-22; Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue
State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1339, 1356-57 (2006).
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that sought out the values of an entity client. Corporations are not human
beings that experience value conflict, continuity, and clarification over
time and through experience. However, they usually have a mission, a
corporate culture, and a public reputation from which values can be
derived. Legal ethicists have a tendency to swoop in after the fact,
survey the ruins of a scandal like Enron and ask: Where were the
lawyers who failed to prevent this harm to the public from occurring? 60
The result is a renewed call for lawyers to step into the breach and
provide moral direction in legal representation to a morally wayward
corporate client. What tends to get overlooked is that the lawyers in
those scandals were not being very good partisan representatives
either. 61 Enron, after all, did not triumph from its misdeeds—it
collapsed. However, I suspect that despite the headline grabbing
scandals, many lawyers who represent entity clients engage in thoughtful
exploration with their clients to discover what is in their client’s longterm interests in ways that approximate client value clarification. 62
I began this talk with the story of the beginning of theoretical legal
ethics as we know it today, suggesting that it grew out of thoughtful
conversations among lawyers about what it meant to be a good lawyer,
and sought to articulate the theoretical foundations and justifications for
good practice. Much of the client-centered lawyering theory grows
similarly out of the experience of practice, and is produced by scholars
embedded in the project of teaching students how to be reflective about
practice experience. I want to end by saying that I hope that legal ethics
can make itself relevant to corporate practice in much the same way.
Rather than endlessly replaying headline grabbing scandals, my hope is
that legal ethicists will go out in search of the lawyers who quietly
exercise good judgment in the day-to-day representation of entity clients,
seek to understand their practices, and build a foundation of theory that
articulates and supports those practices.

60. This question has been traced to the comments made in the savings and loan crisis of the
1980s, which “has become a convenient shorthand used by scholars of the legal profession who
believe . . . that lawyers have failed to take seriously their responsibility as professionals while
representing wealthy corporate clients.” See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation,
99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1167-68 (2005).
61. See, e.g., William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1459-60, 1464-67 (2006).
62. There is some support for this conclusion in an empirical study of the ethical practices of
large firm litigators. See Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics
in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 844-46 (1998) (discussing corporate lawyers’
appeals to client reputation not merely as a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis, but as a way of
“providing a social looking-glass that allows one . . . to see and judge oneself”).

